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COMMENT
NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS UNDER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
TO THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT: EXAMINING THE VIEWPOINTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
of 19271 was amended by Congress. 2 Although the 1972 Amendments sub-
stantially changed3 the 1927 Act, the most significant and controversial
modification was effectuated by section 905(b) 4 which eliminated the in-
jured harbor worker's "seaworthiness" 5 cause of action against the vessel.
Nevertheless, continuing the policy of the superseded section, section 905 (b)
did allow a third party action against the vessel if the claim was grounded
in negligence.0
In amending section 905 (b), Congress apparently granted wide discre-
tion to the courts in fashioning the parameters of the duty owed by the vessel
to the longshoreman. 7 Specifically, in construing the section, there are two
central questions to which Congress provided no specific answers. First, by
eliminating the longshoreman's seaworthiness remedy, did Congress intend
that the remainder of the post-seaworthiness case law should remain intact?
If not, what is the applicable standard to judge the extent of the ship-
owner's duty to the longshoreman? Second, if common law negligence con-
cepts form the applicable initial frame of reference, how are they to be
1. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, §§ 1-48,
44 Stat. 1424 (1927).
2. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (codified in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-49 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
3. For a full discussion of the scope of the changes made by the 1972 Amend-
ments and problems anticipated under those changes, see S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972) (in sections pertinent to this Comment both reports are substan-
tially identical; for convenience citations are made only to the Senate report); G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-46 to -57 (2d ed. 1975) [here-
inafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]; 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PER-
SONAL INJURIES §§ 55-113 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as NORRIS]; Note, Mari-
time Jurisdiction and Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649.
4. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act § 5, 33 U.S.C. §
905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), formerly ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927); see text
accompanying note 77 infra.
5. For a definition of seaworthiness and an outline of the evolution of this doc-
trine in the case law, see notes 24-27 & 59 and accompanying text infra.
6. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 122 & 123 infra.
(244)
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modified because of either the special problems of maritime occupations or
the humanitarian notions of admiralty law? The answers to these questions
are unclear. Most of the courts have concluded that Congress created an
entirely new remedy for the longshoreman, one that was to be referenced
to, if not congruent to, the duties of a contractee-landowner to an employee
of an independent contractor working on the premises.8 In essence, this
means that the common law duty of the landowner to his business invitee
circumscribes the scope of the vessel's duty to the longshoreman. These
decisions are indicative of judicial attitudes which differ significantly from
those which underlay the conclusions of the seaworthiness cases. 9 How-
ever, in reaching this result, the courts may have imposed on the longshore-
man a standard which overlooks the pragmatic needs of maritime occupa-
tions and, more importantly, contemporaneous congressional policy per-
ceptions which may have been more clearly expressed in the enactment of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970.10 The purpose of this
Comment is to review the conclusions of the early cases and to match them
against other possible sources of law which could form the appropriate
frame of reference for the interpretation of section 905 (b). Our beginning
lies in an extremely complex statutory and case law history.
II. COURSE CHANGES IN THE MARITIME LAW OF PERSONAL
INJURIES: THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 905(b)
A. The Early Days
Originally, the work of longshoremen in loading and unloading vessels
was treated as a non-maritime activity." It was not until 1882 that a
harbor worker was able to resort to the admiralty court for a personal
injury claim. 12 In such cases, common law tort principles were applied to
grant or deny claims.13 Following the turn of the century, the enactment of
workmen's compensation statutes in most states prompted Congress to
place the harbor worker under the coverage of the state systems; but,
premised on the need for federal uniformity, the United States Supreme
Court rejected Congress' efforts in two controversial and divided decisions.' 4
As a result of these decisions, harbor workers were the only group of shore-
side workers who were unable to avail themselves of workmen's compensa-
8. See notes 78-93 and accompanying text infra.
9. Compare text accompanying notes 65-67 infra, with notes 17, 124 & 128-35
and accompanying text infra.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 654 et seq. (1970).
11. See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers,
39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954).
12. Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1881) (business invitee on board injured
because of negligently stowed cargo).
13. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 932 (1926) (liability of contractees for
injuries sustained by contractor's employees in the course of contracted work).
14. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker
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tion remedies. The Court's sensitivity to this situation, coupled with Con-
gress' failure to implement the Court's suggestion that a federal compen-
sation system be created for the harbor worker and longshoreman, pre-
cipitated the Court's 1926 decision that the harbor worker was a seaman
for purposes of the Jones Act.'5 Congressional reaction was swift; less
than a year later it enacted the Harbor Workers' and Longshoremen's
Compensation Act of 1927. Under the 1927 Act, the Longshoreman's right
of recovery against his stevedore-employer was exclusively limited to
compensation payments, 16 although a cause of action was preserved against
the shipowner and other third parties who may have caused the injury. 17
Once the plaintiff's status had been ascertained,' 8 the actions during this
period were invariably grounded in familiar negligence concepts.19 Since
15. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). justice
Holmes acknowledged that the Supreme Court was reaching for an equitable decision
in Haverty. He stated: "as the word is commonly used, stevedores are not 'sea-
men.' But words are flexible. The work upon which the plaintiff was engaged was
a maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's crew." Id. at 52 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), is the sea-
man's remedy for personal injuries caused through a negligent act or omission for
which the vessel is responsible.
16. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 5, ch. 509, § 5,
44 Stat. 1426 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
17. This is the standard practice. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ch. XIV passim (1974 ed.) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. The
theoretical basis is that the third party is not privy to the "bargain" struck between
employer and employee. In such a "bargain," the employee gives up the right to
potentially unlimited damages in return for the sure remedy of compensation, while
the converse reflects the employer's half of the compromise. See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as W. PROSSER].
Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974), an early
case construing and interpreting section 905(b) to establish the standard of care owed
by the shipowner to the longshoreman, offered a similar explanation of the trade-off
that was represented by elimination of the longshoreman's seaworthiness remedy:
Congress concluded that the judicially created protection in the Sierackil/Ryan
[Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)] line of cases was not viable and
fashioned an alternative in the 1972 Amendments. A tradeoff was made by Con-
gress in an attempt to balance the interests of all parties involved. Under the
plan as formulated by Congress, the longshoreman lost his claim against the
vessel under the warranty of seaworthiness allowed by Sieracki, and in return
was granted much higher compensation benefits. The stevedoring company that
employs the longshoreman was forced to pay the higher workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, but was relieved of liability from Ryan-type indemnity suits brought
by the vessel. The vessel lost its indemnity rights against the stevedoring com-
pany, but had its liability to longshoremen limited to cases where its negligence
can be proved.
Id. at 650 (citations omitted). The notions expressed by the Ramirez court form
an important underpinning for current case law constructions of sections 905(b).
See notes 91, 124 & 141 and accompanying text infra. See also Comment, Risk Dis-
tribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174, 1183-85 (1966) (discussing this
theory in connection with the case law prior to the 1972 Amendments).
18. It was during this period that the court wrestled with the "maritime but
local" and "twilight zone" doctrines in maritime personal injury and compensation
cases. The most useful discussion of these cases may be found in G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-48 to -52 (1st ed. 1957).
19. E.g., The Prince Rupert City, 30 F. Supp. 755 (N.D. Fla. 1939).
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the actions were relatively few,20 fundamental differences as to the scope of
the duties which the longshoreman, stevedore, and shipowner owed inter
sese were not of particular importance or, at least, were not litigated.
B. Seamen's Remedies: The Judicial Doctrine of "Seaworthiness"
For the seaman, however, there were important developments in mari-
time negligence concepts throughout this period. Negligence standards
developed under the Jones Act began to suggest judicial viewpoints that
were considerably more liberal than their counterparts as evolved under
common law negligence. 21 The unspoken social perceptions of these cases
laid the philosophical foundation for the next development in the law of
maritime personal injuries, the judicial doctrine of "seaworthiness."
In 1944, with the advent of the Court's "humanitarian majority,"22 the
storm of third party suits first began to break in Mahnich v. Southern
Steamship Co.23 In this case, the Court's discovery of the maritime doc-
trine of near absolute liability - "seaworthiness" 24 - greatly expanded
the rights of the seaman. Two years later, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,25
the longshoreman too was afforded a seaworthiness cause of action "because
he was doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards. '26
The availability of seaworthiness as a cause of action to both longshore-
men and seamen substantially impeded the clear development of maritime
20. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-4, at 278.
21. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939). In Socony,
the Court held that assumption of risk was not available as a defense in seamen's
personal injury cases even though the case presented a situation where the injured
plaintiff had a choice between a safeway to accomplish the job and a dangerous way.
A fuller discussion of this development may be found in GILMORE & BLACK, Supra
note 3, §§ 6-26 to -37, at 351-83.
22. See, e.g., GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-1 (a), at 274-75; Tetreault,
supra note 11, at 400, 418.
23. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
24. The Court has defined seaworthiness as
essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other well known in-
stances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards which perform-
ing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negli-
gence nor contractual in character. It is a form of absolute duty owing to all
within the range of its humanitarian policy.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946) (citations omitted). In
outlining the possible parameters of this doctrine, the Court has stated:
[A] vessel's condition of unseaworthiness might arise from any number of circum-
stances. Her gear might be defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her crew
unfit. The number of men assigned to perform a shipboard task might be insuffi-
cient. The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its stowage, might be
improper. For any of these reasons, or others, a vessel might not be reasonably
fit for her intended service.
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971). For an exhaustive
listing of conditions which may result in the vessel being found unseaworthy, see
2 NoRRis, supra note 3, § 323.
25. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Sieracki and Mahnich formed the driving forces of the
great wave of third party maritime personal injury cases which now began to engulf
the courts. See Turner v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D. 412
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
26. 328 U.S. at 99.
COMMENT
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negligence concepts since, in most cases, where there was negligence, there
was also unseaworthiness.27 However, in a limited number of Jones Act
cases where the plaintiff's cause of action was based on negligence alone, 26
the Court continued to liberalize negligence concepts in maritime personal
injury cases. This expansion was justified on the grounds that the mari-
time worker was unable to protect himself from extraordinary dangers
entailed in his work and that he was not financially capable of bearing the
resulting injuries 2 9 This liberalization of the theories of maritime negli-
gence resulted in significant expansion of the scope of a shipowner's duty
as well as the practical elimination of the requirement of a causal relation-
ship between the breach of duty and the injury.30 For example, in Hopson
v. Texaco, Inc.,3 1 a vessel's officer hired an independent taxi driver to
transport injured seamen to a local hospital. 32 While on route to the
hospital, an accident occurred which was caused solely by the fault of the
driver.38 By holding the shipowner liable for the negligence of the taxi
driver,8 4 the Court, in effect, abrogated the distinction between an agent
and an independent contractor for the purposes of maritime negligence.
Similarly, the shipowner was found liable in Kernan v. American Dredging
Co.,35 a case in which a seaman was fatally burned when an oil spill was
ignited by a navigation lamp. The lamp was hung in a manner which
violated Coast Guard navigation rules since it was only 3 feet above the
water.86 This regulation was not designed to prevent the type of accident
which occurred. The Court, however, found that violation of the rule was
negligence,3 7 thus rejecting the common law rule that breach of a statutory
27. See text accompanying notes 86 & 119 infra.
28. These cases are of considerable importance in that they allow isolation of
the negligence theory since seaworthiness was not advanced as an alternative theory
of recovery. E.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958); see
text accompanying note 86 infra. The longshoreman had no occasion to seek to
develop liberal standards of maritime negligence principles when he was injured since
negligence and seaworthiness were largely coterminous. See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 3, § 6-57, at 449-55. But see Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400
U.S. 494 (1971); text accompanying notes 60 & 61 infra. If the longshoreman was
not aboard the vessel when injured, he could only pursue those remedies available
under state law. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 223-24
(1969). However, the law was complex and unsettled in this area. See GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-49, at 418-23. In the 1972 Amendments, Congress improved
this situation by moving the coverage of the Act ashore. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp.
IV, 1974). Problems remain, however, concerning the scope of coverage and remedies
available to a longshoreman who is injured ashore. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 3, § 6-50, at 423-26.
29. Cf. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-35, at 376-77.
30. See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 451-52 (1958)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ; text accompanying notes 35-37 infra).
31. 383 U.S. 262 (1966).
32. Id. at 263.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 264.
35. 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
36. Id. at 427-28.
37. Id. at 439.
[VOL. 21
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duty was negligence only if the resulting injury was of the type which the
statute sought to prevent.
38
In addition to these developments, the Supreme Court significantly
reduced the quantum of evidence which was necessary to take the plaintiff's
case to the jury. In Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp.,3 9 the
plaintiff sued to recover damages for a serious tubercular illness alleged
to have been caused when he was washed overboard while at sea. 40 Although
no medical witness could testify that the accident in fact caused the illness,
41
the Court, in reversing the trial court, held the evidence sufficient to support
the jury's conclusion that the illness was caused by the accident.4 2 In
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,43 the plaintiff was injured
while using a knife to remove frozen ice cream from a container.44 The
Court rejected the defendant's argument that it was not reasonably fore-
seeable that the plaintiff would use the knife to remove the ice cream
although the defendant acknowledged that it had failed to furnish a tool
adequate for the job. 45 Reinstating the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the
Court held:
[T]he jury . . .plays a preeminent role in . . .Jones Act cases ...
It was not necessary that [the defendant] be in a position to foresee
the exact chain of circumstances which actually led to the accident....
[T]he standard of liability under the Jones Act is that established by
Congress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. . . . "Under
this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify
with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part,
even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages
are sought."
'46
It appears then that the thrust of these opinions was to mandate that the
shipowner, as employer, was required to furnish to his seamen, as employees,
a place of employment free from recognizable hazards, even though this
was not required under common law negligence concepts or the resultant
injury was not foreseeable in the common law sense.
38. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 200-04.
39. 361 U.S. 107 (1959).
40. Id. at 107-08.
41. Id. at 109.
42. Id. at 110. In a similar common law action, it is unlikely that the court
would have allowed recovery. See, e.g., Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss.
483, 186 So. 625 (1939) ; W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 241.
43. 352 U.S. 521 (1957).
44. Id. at 522.
45. Id. at 523.
46. Id., quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (cita-
tions omitted). One authority has added this amplification:
[C]ommon law standards of negligence, even as those standards are applied in
railroad cases decided under the Federal Employees' Liability Act do not neces-
sarily apply to the conditions of maritime employment: the shipowner's duty may
be higher than that of the shore employer and the quantum of negligence needed to
establish his liability less.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, §6-35, at 376.
COMMENT
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C. Longshoremen's Recoveries Under the 1927 Act: Circular Liability
Although criticized heavily, 47 Sieracki was enlarged and extended.
The difficulty was that most injuries were not caused by the condition
of the vessel; rather, they were caused by an act or omission of the
stevedore or his employee 48 - who in some cases was the litigant himself.
49
Under the doctrine of seaworthiness, these acts or omissions were chargeable
against the vessel owner.50 This state of affairs was highly unsatisfactory
to the shipowner, and therefore, he began to cast about for a way out of
the problem. 51 But Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp.52 presented a most formidible barrier to resolution of the plight of
the unhappy shipowner. In Halcyon, the Court held that there could be no
contribution among joint tortfeasors in maritime personal injury cases
not involving collision. 3
Initially, all of this was probably of limited concern to the stevedore.
He was liable for compensation in any event, and, if the employee were
successful in a third party action, the stevedore had a right of subrogation
as the compensation payor.54 However, the favored position of the steve-
dore was soon to undergo a radical change. Despite Halcyon and the
exclusive remedy provision of the 1927 Act regarding the extent of the
stevedore's liability, the Court, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp.,55 allowed the vessel to recover the damages for which it
was liable to the injured longshoreman from the stevedore in an indemnifi-
cation action for the breach of an express or implied warranty of work-
manlike performance. 56 The shipowner's success in Ryan thus possibly
became the most important catalyst in generating the brooding set of forces
which eventually led to the 1972 Amendments.
Despite strong dissatisfaction with, and sharp criticism of, the Sieracki-
Ryan doctrine, 57 political vectors prevented congressional consensus and
47. E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 103-08 (1946) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) ; Tetreault, supra note 11, at 416. But see Hearings on H.R. 207 Before
the Subcom. on Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 149-56 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings];
Comment, supra note 17, at 1179-80.
48. Much, if not most, of the case law has revolved about this very point. See,
e.g., cases cited in note 59 infra.
49. Admiralty's rule of comparative negligence would only serve to mitigate
damages, not to bar recovery. See, e.g., Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921
(9th Cir. 1966).
50. See George, Ship's Liability to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness -
Sieracki through Usner, 3 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 45 (1971).
51. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-55, at 442.
52. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
53. Id. at 285-86.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
55. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
56. Id. at 128-34.
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the likelihood of amelioratory action.58 During this hiatus, the Court con-
tinued to elaborate upon the circular liability problem. As the majority
viewpoint on the Court shifted back and forth, the case law permutations
and combinations of this doctrine became confused if not contradictory. 59
Nevertheless, there was some recognition that the Court may have
gone too far in this area of judicial legislation. Shortly before the enactment
of the 1972 Amendments a "new" majority in the Court arose and the
tide began to turn. In Usner v. Luckenback Overseas Corp.,60 the Court
found that a single act of negligence of a fellow longshoreman did not
render the vessel unseaworthy. In addition, the Court held that operating
negligence was distinct from unseaworthiness. 61 In Victory Carriers, Inc.
v. Law, 2 the same majority diluted the implications which had been raised
in a number of earlier cases and which had seemed to suggest that the
vessel's liability for seaworthiness might be extended to the stevedore's
operations on the pier.63 The Victory Court explicitly held that there was
58. The Congress unsuccessfully attempted to amend the 1927 Act in 1958 and
1961. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 22; Hearings on Bills Relating to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The Senate
report explicitly acknowledged this problem:
The Committee also has taken note of the inescapable fact that the contro-
versy over third party claims by longshoremen has had political ramifications
which have resulted in forestalling any improvements in the present Act for over
twelve years.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
59. For instance, in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), the vessel had
been demised to the stevedore under a bareboat charter for the period of the loading
operations. The Court treated the stevedore as an owner pro hac vice and allowed
an in rem recovery against the vessel in spite of the exclusive liability provision of
the 1927 Act and the fact that it was the stevedore's equipment which had created
the unseaworthy condition. In Weyerheuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.,
355 U.S. 563 (1958), the Court allowed indemnification against the stevedore where
there was no unseaworthy condition and the vessel and the stevedore were con-
currently negligent. Furthermore, in Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358
U.S. 423 (1959), the Court permitted indemnification against the stevedore where
his employee "brought into play" the unseaworthy condition of the vessel. The
Court, in Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), extended sea-
worthiness to the pier, when it permitted a longshoreman to recover for injuries
received when he had slipped on beans which had been spilled from a defective bag
in the course of the unloading operation. In Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione
v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964), the longshoreman-plaintiff re-
covered on a seaworthiness action against the vessel where the defective equipment
was supplied by the stevedore even though the defect was latent and no negligence
of the stevedore was involved. Nonetheless, the Court allowed indemnification against
the stevedore, holding that negligence of the stevedore was not necessary when the
defective equipment had been supplied by him. Many more cases, too numerous to
recount here, proceeded upon similar judicial voyages. See, e.g., Proudfoot, "The
Tar Baby": Maritime Personal Injury Indemnity Actions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 423
(1968), wherein the inconsistencies of the cases which followed in the wake of
Sieracki and Ryan are discussed.
60. 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
61. Id. at 500. See also Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097 (Sd
Cir. 1973).
62. 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
63. Compare, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Steve-
doring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964), with Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S.
COMMENT
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no admiralty jurisdiction over an action by a longshoreman injured on the
dock in the course of a loading operation while operating a forklift owned
by the stevedore. 64 Usner and Victory are not without meaning although
the 1972 Amendments are in effect and cases interpreting them are just
beginning to filter up through the appellate process. There remains a
question which was raised by Usner and Victory and is as yet unanswered:
What was the unspoken perception of the majority in those opinions?
They may stand only for the proposition that the Court had finally over-
stepped itself in Sieracki's progeny; but, more significantly, they could
indicate that the Court has reevaluated its doctrinal stance and begun to
turn away from the special status which the maritime worker has been
afforded in admiralty for over half a century. Much of the future case
law will turn on the answer to this question and the circuit courts' evalu-
ations of what were the true motivations of the Usner and Victory ma-
jorities. However, an objective evaluation of the meaning that these cases
hold for section 905(b) plaintiffs is impossible at this time.
D. Historical Impacts on Interpretation of Section 905(b)
It is likely that the Sieracki-Ryan line of cases were the result of
three rarely expressed, but fundamental notions: first, a general dissatisfac-
tion with the low levels of compensation available under the 1927 Act
and a realistic assessment that Congress would act only infrequently to
amend the available levels of payments ;65 second, a humanitarian appraisal
of the difficult societal position of the seriously injured worker and family
suddenly cut off from wages and only receiving niggardly compensation
payments;66 and third, a recognition that most injuries to longshoremen
were attributable to the failure of the stevedore to correct unsafe conditions
or to supply adequate equipment for loading and unloading operations.67
When these notions coalesced with the probable perception that strict
adherence to the exclusive liability provision of the 1927 Act and its low
compensation awards would provide little incentive for necessary remedial
action, the Sieracki-Ryan doctrine became an almost inevitable response.
206 (1963). Both cases are briefly discussed in note 59 supra. The 1972 Amendments
moved the coverage of the Act ashore. See note 28 supra. However, in view of the
reluctance of the Victory majority to extend seaworthiness ashore despite the humani-
tarian and historical arguments offered by the dissent, it is likely that Victory will
have an impact on the interpretation of section 905(b).
64. 404 U.S. at 215.
65. Cf. note 58 supra.
66. Cf. SENATE REPORT 92-1125, supra note 3, at 4-5. The Senate report stated:
[W]ith the vast improvement in compensation benefits which the bill would
provide, there is no compelling reason to continue to require vessels to assume
what amounts to absolute liability for injuries which occur to longshoremen or
other workers under the Act who are injured while working on those vessels.
Id. at 9. Compare authorities cited in note 17 supra. See generally GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 3, ch. VI passim.
67. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 U.S. 315 (1964), where the Court stated, that "liability should fall upon the
[VOL. 21
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As noted, the courts have concluded that section 905 (b) created an
entirely new remedy for the injured longshoreman, or, at least, a remedy
that was no longer as strongly rooted in the traditions of maritime law.6 8
Yet, these initial decisions really do not write upon a clean slate. The
concerns which prompted the Sieracki-Ryan doctrine are too firmly a part
of admiralty's humanitarian spirit to be long forgotten.
"[T]he ancient characterization of seamen as wards of admiralty is
even more accurate now than it was formerly."... Out of this relation
of dependence and submission there emerges for the stronger party
a corresponding standard or obligation of fostering protection.69
Twice the longshoreman has been found by the Court to occupy substan-
tially the same status as the seaman and thus enjoy the same protections3 °
A more difficult and more important question involves an estimation
of how far the doctrines developed in Jones Act negligence cases might
apply in longshoremen's section 905(b) action. It should be noted, how-
ever, that it is likely that analogous, if not identical, judicial policy per-
ceptions shaped both the Jones Act and the seaworthiness lines of cases.
Concrete expressions of maritime negligence theories applicable to the
conditions found in the longshoring industry are lacking only because the
seaworthiness doctrine obviated the need to examine this problem in detail.
7 1
Whatever the similarities or differences between conditions in the industry
during the Sieracki-Ryan period and the present, it is unlikely that the
law ultimately will be able to develop without regard to these earlier cases
and the judicial perceptions which formed their foundation and generating
force. 72  Yet, it is the implications raised by these cases which hold
meaning for interpreting section 905(b) and not their specific holdings.
Two courts have already rejected the hypothesis that Jones Act
negligence standards form the applicable frame of reference for section
905(b) actions.7 3 This result seems sound because the same reasons justi-
party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the likeli-
hood of injury." Id. at 324. The Senate report added:
It is important to note that adequate workmen's compensation benefits are
not only essential to meeting the needs of the injured employee and his family,
but, by assuring that the employer bears the cost of the unsafe conditions, serve
to strengthen the employer's incentive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-
job safety.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
68. See text accompanying notes 78-93 infra.
69. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932) (Cardoza,
J.), quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897). See also Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 413 (1954) (Black, J.).
70. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); International Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
71. See note 28 supra.
72. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-53, at 436-38; cf. id. § 6-57, at 449-55.
73. Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 384 F. Supp. 230, 235 n.3,
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fying congressional withdrawal of the seaworthiness remedy from long-
shoremen are likely to apply with equal force in denying longshoremen the
special advantages of Jones Act negligence concepts - concepts which
must relate to the hazards and discipline inherent in the performance of
the duties of a seaman. The discipline to which seamen are subject, the
unique danger of their occupation, and the absence of a compensation pro-
gram for seamen comparable to that for longshoremen seem to generate
quite different parameters in measuring a rule of tort law for each of
the two different situations when logical social policy dictate they74 arrive
at the same result. Yet at the same time, it is well to recall that the Jones
Act cases are arguably the most reliable course markers as to how maritime
negligence law in longshoremen's personal injury cases would have de-
veloped in the period stretching from 1944 until 1972 if Sieracki had not
supervened.
75
III. AN OVERVIEW OF INITIAL DECISIONS CONSTRUING
SECTION 905 (b)
As enacted, section 905 (b) creates a number of problems which
eventually will have to be resolved by the courts. 78 Most importantly for
74. Cf. LARSON, supra note 17, § 72.50, at 14-95. The author stated:
If there is no strong reason of compensation policy for destroying
rights as to ... third parties, then, every presumption should be on the side of
preserving those rights, once basic compensation protection has been assured....
The injured plaintiff has a right to be made whole - not just partly whole - and
the more inadequate compensation recoveries appear, the more cogent becomes
this argument.
Id.
75. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
76. A relevant secondary effect of section 905(b) was to again expose the ship-
owner to full liability for the longshoreman's injuries even though the stevedore was
concurrently negligent. This problem is particularly significant where the fault of the
shipowner is minor compared to that of the stevedore. Quick to apprehend the unfair-
ness of such a result, shipping interests have urged a variety of ameliorative solutions
to this problem. In the leading case of Lucas v. "Brinknes" Shiffahrts Ges., 379 F.
Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the defendant-shipowner advanced what is probably the
full scope of theories to limit the shipowner's liability to the stevedore: 1) that the
vessel was liable only when it was solely negligent, id. at 766; 2) that the vessel could
seek contribution from the stevedore, id. at 769; 3) that the vessel was entitled to a
pro rata release of liability if the stevedore were jointly negligent, or that the vessel
was only liable for its proportionate fault in causing the injury, id. at 766; 4) that
the vessel's liability should be reduced pro tanto by the extent of payments made by
the stevedore to the longshoremen, id. at 760. This assertion was based on the case
of Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Murray was decided
under the 1927 Act, the applicable compensation act for workers in Washington, D.C.
The court allowed a pro rata credit on the liability obtained against the defendant
where the government was jointly negligent and the plaintiff was a Government em-
ployee. The Lucas court distinguished Murray as not involving a maritime matter, 379
F. Supp. at 764.
The Lucas court first found that the recent case of Cooper Stevedoring Co.
v. Kopke, 417 U.S. 106 (1974), had virtually eliminated the restrictions of Halcyon,
leaving "admiralty courts . . . relatively free to fashion appropriate rules of con-
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the purposes of this Comment, the 1972 Amendments do not indicate
whether maritime or common law negligence theories form the intended
standard against which the shipowner's duty of care to either the steve-
dore or the employee is to be measured. In pertinent part, section 905(b)
provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under the chapter
cause by the negligence of a vessel, then such person ... may bring an
action against such vessel as a third party ... and the employer shall not
be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any
agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person
was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such
action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence
of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel....
The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based
upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time
the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be
exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel. .... 77
What then is negligence?
tribution based on fairness to the parties." 379 F. Supp. at 764. In Cooper, the
Court had distinguished Halcyon and allowed a shipowner to recover contribution
from a stevedore, other than the plaintiff's employer, whose negligence in another port
created the unsafe condition causing the plaintiff's injuries. 417 U.S. at 113-15. Cooper
commenced prior to the enactment of the 1972 Amendments. Despite this, the Lucas
court disagreed with the shipowner's proposals, concluding:
Congress decided that the primary duty to provide a safe place to work is on the
stevedore. The substantial increase in compensation benefits provided by the
amendments was thought to be an incentive to the stevedore to provide a safe
place to work. . . . At the same time, however, Congress was concerned that the
vessel owner not become lax in doing what it should reasonably be required to
do to prevent injuries to the longshoreman. The common law negligence remedy
was thought sufficient to provide the vessel with the necessary incentive. The
argument ...that the shipowner can be liable only when it is solely negligent
would negate Congress' intention to prevent shipowner negligence and is con-
trary to the terms of the Act....
. . .Congress sought to eliminate all actions against the stevedore ...
Allowance of any such actions, even a pro tanto recovery to the extent of pay-
ments made by the employer under the Act, would create the circuitous type
action Congress considered was too costly and disruptive of the compensation
scheme to be permitted.
379 F. Supp. at 768-69 (emphasis supplied by the court).
For a complete discussion of other problems raised by section 905(b), see
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, §§ 6-46 to -57. The question decided in Lucas has
also been of importance in land-based third party compensation actions. There is a
considerable amount of confusion in this area of the law. See LARSON, supra note 17,
§§ 75.22-.23. See also id. § 72.80.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). A vessel for the purposes of the
statute is defined as
any vessel upon which or in connection with which any person entitled to benefits
under this Chapter suffers injury or death arising out of or in the course of his
employment, and said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss2/3
256 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 21
A. Illustrative Judicial Viewpoints
Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp.78 (Hite II) is probably the leading
case to date. In Hite II, the plaintiff asserted that section 905(b) should
be interpreted in light of maritime principles of negligence. The plaintiff
contended that the shipowner's duty of care was "a non-delegable duty to
provide a reasonably safe place to work for those business invitees that
board the vessel to perform contract work for the vessel owner. ' 79 Although
the Hite II court, in granting a directed verdict for the defendant, could
have relied on the plaintiff's failure to show that the vessel or crew was
in any way connected with the defective equipment causing the injury,80
the court chose instead to hold that the applicable negligence standard
under section 905(b) was analogous to the common law duty of care
owed by landowner to a business invitee. Specifically, the shipowner was
to exercise reasonable care to have the premise in a reasonably safe
condition for use by the independent contractor and to give said con-
tractor warning of any concealed or latent defects that are known by
the owner and not by the independent contractor. The owner of a
premise is under no duty to warn the independent contractor or his
employees of dangers or open and obvious defects which are known
to the independent contractor or his employees or which could be
readily observed by said employees in the exercise of due care.8'
78. 380 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Tex. 1974). In Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
375 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1974), (Hite I), the court held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to assert a negligence claim against the vessel based upon a violation of
safety regulations applicable only to the stevedore's operations. Id. at 237. Compare
Hite 1, with notes 149-56 and accompanying text infra.
79. 380 F. Supp. at 224.
80. Id at 223. The plaintiff's injuries were caused by a fall after he touched a
defective electrical cord of which he was aware prior to the accident. Id. No facts
were presented to show that the officers or crew maintained any degree of control or
supervision over the work being performed. Id. at 224.
81. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted). An obviously dangerous condition may not
be enough alone to insulate the shipowner from liability. Cf. Landon v. Lief Hoegh
& Co., 386 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
In dicta, the Hite II court opined that the following standards would also
be applicable:
(1) The vessel owner is not liable to an independent contractor or his employees
if the injury is caused by a condition that said contractor has been employed
to correct.
(2) The vessel owner who retains no more right of control of the independent
contractor's work than the necessity to secure satisfactory completion of the
work owes no duty to protect the independent contractor and his employees
from dangerous conditions arising during the performance of the work.
(3) The vessel owner owes no duty to warn the independent contractor or his
employees of dangerous conditions created on the vessel by said employees
during the performance of their work.
380 F. Supp. at 227 n.10 (citations omitted). These standards generally comport with
the common law duties of a general contractor. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d
1379 (1953) (duty of owner of premises to furnish independent contractor or his em-
ployee with a safe place to work where the contract is for repairs) ; Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 870 (1951) (general contractor's liability for injury to the employees of
subcontractors); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 268 (1949) (employer's negligence in hiring
a careless, reckless, or incompetent independent contractor).
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Hite II was substantially followed in Fedison v. Vessel Wislica,8 2
and Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K.8s However, these cases added several
important refinements. In Fedison, the plaintiff was injured because of an
obviously dangerous condition which had developed in the stowed cargo.8 4
The court, noting that the crew was aware that such conditions were likely
to develop in the cargo, held that this "sort of constructive knowledge
imposed no duty upon the vessel to ...warn the longshoremen" of the
condition.8" In Ramirez, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument for a
maritime negligence standard similar to that which had been urged by
the plaintiff in Hite II. The court stated that the so-called negligence
principles found in post-Sieracki decisions had to be read with care because
they often reflected "the rationale of the warranty of seaworthiness even
when talking in terms of a negligence standard."88 The court went on to
suggest that after a long voyage it would be unreasonable to assume that a
ship would be a safe place in which to work.8 7 The court concluded, there-
fore, that the vessel owner's duty of care to the longshoreman would be
satisfied by placing the vessel in a condition which an experienced stevedore
would reasonably expect to encounter in the course of his work.88
In Citizen v. M/V Triton8 9 the plaintiff contended that a negligence
action should lie if the vessel arrived in port with an unseaworthy condition
of which the master knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could
have known.90 In rejecting this contention as "in effect allowing a cause
of action based on unseaworthiness," the court reasoned that to hold the
defendant liable for the condition of the stow would circumvent the purposes
82. 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974).
83. 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
84. 382 F. Supp. at 5.
85. Id. at 8. However, the court also specifically found that the vessel had
received no notice of the dangerous condition until after the injury. Id. at 6. Proper
dunnage would have corrected the condition. Dunnage was to be obtained from the
vessel as needed; however, the plaintiff was unable to establish that a request had
been made to the vessel's officers for proper dunnage. There is a suggestion in the
opinion that had the plaintiff been able to show that dunnage was withheld after
being requested, the vessel would have been negligent. Id. at 5-6.
86. 385 F. Supp. at 653. Compare GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-57, at 452.
87. 385 F. Supp. at 651. The Ramirez standard of care for the shipowner was
essentially identical to that proposed in Hite II. Id. at 646. A fact of considerable
importance for the Ramirez court was that while either plaintiff, in accordance with
union policy, could have stopped the loading operation at any time had an unsafe
condition developed, neither chose to do so. Id. at 648.
88. Id. at 651, citing Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601
(S.D. Cal. 1959), aff'd sub noma. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet
Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1960). Hugev dealt with the duty of care which the
vessel owed the stevedore and which would defeat the stevedore's indemnification
recovery. However, the Ramirez court concluded that the situations were analogous
and that the Hugev holding fairly indicated the standard of care demanded by
section 905(b). 385 F. Supp. at 652. Hugev has been cited with apparent approval
by the Supreme Court. See Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping
Co., Ltd., 394 U.S. 404, 416 n.18 (1969). See also Proudfoot, supra note 59, at 443-45.
89. 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
90. Id at 201.
COMMENT
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of the 1972 Amendments." In dictum, however, the court added that the
1972 Amendments abolished the Sieracki-Ryan rationale for negligence as
well as for unseaworthiness and non-delegable duty. 92 The court finally
concluded that "[t]he injured longshoreman is in the same position he
would be in had he been injured in the non-maritime employment ashore
and his burden of proving negligence is greater than that of a seaman under
the Jones Act."93
In contrast to the element of fault required by the courts in these cases,
the court in Streatch v. Associated Container Transportation, Ltd.o"
allowed suit under a strict products liability theory. The plaintiff was in-
jured aboard the vessel as a result of an alleged defect in vehicle furnished
by the vessel owner for cargo operations.95 The court denied a motion to
dismiss the plaintiff's claim which was based on a strict liability theory 0
akin to that of Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts.97 To reach
91. Id. However, the following hypothetical, offered in the Senate report, appears
to contradict the court's conclusion:
Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence will meet the
objective of encouraging safety because the vessel will still be required to exer-
cise the same care as a land-based person in providing a safe place to work. Thus,
nothing in this bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take
appropriate corrective action where it knows or should have known about a
dangerous condition.
So, for example, where a longshoreman slips on an oil spill on a vessel's
deck and is injured, the proposed amendments to [section 905] would still permit
an action against the vessel for negligence. To recover he must establish that:
1) the vessel put the foreign substance on the deck, or knew that it was there,
and willfully of [sic] negligently failed to remove it; or 2) the foreign sub-
stance had been on the deck for such a period of time that it should have been dis-
covered and removed by the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care by the vessel
under the circumstances. The vessel will not be chargeable with the negligence
of the stevedore or employees of the stevedore.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11.
In Citizen, the plaintiff's employer was also the stevedore who had unsafely
loaded the cargo in an earlier port of call. 384 F. Supp. at 199. Knowledge of an un-
seaworthy condition may well be the intended congressional standard. Cf. notes 119
& 120 and accompanying text infra.
92. 384 F. Supp. at 201. In effect, this indicates that all of Sieracki's underlying
humanitarian notions have been abrogated. Furthermore, as a guide to future case
development, the court stated that "[i]n view of the 1972 Amendments, the court
must look to the decisions prior to the time of Sieracki and Ryan to determine negli-
gence on the part of the defendant vessel." Id. But see Slaughter v. Steamship Ronde,
390 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aF'd, 509 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted) ; see Birrer v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana,
386 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Ore. 1974). The Birrer court held that stringent state safety
standards and duty of care imposed on general contractors by state statute were
inappropriate as a guide to the shipowner's duty of care under the 1972 Amendments,
even though the state's high standard had been held by the Supreme Court, in Hess
v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), to be applicable in a maritime wrongful
death action.
94. 388 F. Supp. 935 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
95. Id. at 936.
96. Id. at 937.
97. Section 402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer-
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
[VOL. 21
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this result, the court postulated that: 1) a products liability theory was
not "contrary to federal legislation or admiralty law precedents" and widely
followed in common law jurisdictions could be drawn into maritime law ;98
and 2) under this theory an action would lie against the shipowner if he
had acted in the legal status of a bailor and not as a vessel owner qua
vessel owner. 99 The court held that the plaintiff's allegation that the
chattel, a vehicle, was provided for consideration was sufficient to prevent
dismissal even though the vehicle was provided and used solely for unload-
ing and loading operations aboard the vessel and was normally transported
on the vessel.100
The defendant in Streatch argued that strict liability claims against the
vessel were precluded because Congress had "rejected the thesis that a
vessel should be liable without regard to its fault for injuries."'1 1 In
answering this argument, the court expressed notions far different from
those found in Hite II, Fedison, Ramirez, and Citizen:
[T]he Court believes that the above quoted sentence is merely an
imprecise way of stating that the [Congress] was proposing to end
unseaworthiness liability of a vessel to a longshoreman . . . .Strict
liability in tort ... is not such a broad and absolute liability ....
[I]t can be argued that strict liability in tort does not fall within
the Congressional rejection of the liability of a vessel "without regard
to its fault." But the more persuasive argument is ...that the lan-
guage used by the congressional committee was an imprecise synonym
for unseaworthiness liability. 102
The early decisions discussed in this Comment are illustrative of the
positions which courts may be expected to take in section 905 (b) cases.
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Compare note 24 and accom-
panying text supra.
98. 388 F. Supp. at 938. See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R. Fed. 502 (1971)
(products liability claim as within admiralty jurisdiction).
99. 388 F. Supp. at 940, 942. In an analogous situation another federal district
court refused to separate the stevedore's operations into components in order to hold
him liable as an owner pro hac vice. Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
384 F. Supp. 230, 237 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See also LARSON, supra note 17, § 72.80
(discussing the dual-capacity doctrine).
100. 388 F. Supp. at 937. However, the court suggested in a caveat that, if the
vehicle was to be used by a knowledgeable and limited class, the action would not lie.
Id. at 941, 943.
101. Id. at 940, quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
102. 388 F. Supp. at 940.
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However, due to the narrow fact situations103 confronted by the courts
in these cases, it would be a mistake to suggest that cases such as Hite II
can be viewed as entirely predictive of negligence standards which the
courts may be expected to develop in future cases. Rather, these decisions
are better read as indicative of imperfectly expressed judicial attitudes
differing significantly from those which underlay the conclusions of the
Sieracki-Ryan line of cases. They diverge in their analyses because each
court viewed congressional intent in enacting section 905 (b) differently.
In Hite II, Fedison, Ramirez, and Citizen the underlying judicial notions in
effect seem to take the longshoreman's section 905 (b) action entirely outside
of the maritime law. Is this result justifiable in the maritime background of
longshoremen's personal injury actions?
B. Longshoreman's Injuries: A Maritime Matter
Even if one accepts the proposition that the shipowner's duty to the
longshoreman is to be measured by the content of the obligations of a
contractee landowner, a necessary postulate, supported by the case law
background of maritime personal injuries extending back to Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen,10 4 is that the nature of the longshoreman's action
against the shipowner is essentially maritime. Thus, it can be expected that
common law perceptions as expressed in common law tort rules will in-
eluctably be altered when transplanted into admiralty.10 5 Additionally,
where the underlying theoretical basis for the common law rule is assump-
tion of risk or contributory negligence, that rule should have limited
application in maritime litigation.'0 6
103. Cases such as Hite II seemed to have reached broad conclusions of law not
necessarily justified by the facts as reported. In the majority of cases applying
common law negligence concepts, it is fairly evident that the cause of the injuries was
the negligence of the stevedore 'to provide proper equipment or the longshoreman
himself. See, e.g., note 80 supra. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs' ideas as to
the vessel's standard of care differed from seaworthiness only on a verbal level. See,
e.g., text accompanying notes 78 & 79 supra. See also Proudfoot, supra note 59, at
42-45. In a number of cases the courts noted that the plaintiffs had worked safely
around the alleged unsafe condition for a matter of hours before the injuries occurred.
E.g., Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
Apparently, where there has been some act or omission attributable to the vessel, the
courts have not been quite so dogmatic in their holdings. See note 126 infra.
104. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). In Jensen, the Supreme Court held a state work-
man's compensation statute unconstitutional as applied to a longshoreman who had
been injured under circumstances which constituted a maritime tort.
105. Cf. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936). In that case, which in-
volved an analogous situation construing the Jones Act, the Court stated:
The Jones Act thus brings into the maritime law new rules of liability. The
source from which these rules are drawn defines them but prescribe9 nothing as
to their operation in the field to which they are transferred. "In that field their
strength and operation come altogether from their inclusion in the maritime
law" by virtue of the Jones Act. The election for which it provides "is between
the alternatives accorded by the maritime law as modified ad not between that
law and some non-maritime system."
Id. at 119, quoting Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1924).
106. For example, Ramirez specifically cites section 343A of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS (duty of care that an owner of premises owes to a business in-
[VOL. 21
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Most importantly, an automatic, and thus unanalyzed, application of
common law negligence theories to actions that are essentially maritime
in character ignores the implications raised by Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique.10 7 In Kermarec, the plaintiff, who was not a
member of the ship's company, was injured while visiting a seaman on
board. The Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff was injured aboard
a ship upon navigable waters, the case was within the full range of ad-
miralty jurisdiction, and thus, it was error for the district court to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff was only to be accorded the status of a gratuitous
licensee under state law.10 8 In so concluding, the Court added:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee
and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land,
a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism.
In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban society, with its
complex economic and individual relationships, modern common-law
courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal
refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law
categories, and to delineate fine graduation in the standards of care
which the landowner owes to each. Yet even within a singe jurisdic-
tion, the classifications and subclassifications bred by the common law
have produced confusion and conflict.10 9
vitee) as defining the standard of care owed by the shipowner to the longshoreman.
385 F. Supp. at 646. However, the basic legal theory controlling the scope of the land-
owner's duty as defined in the section is assumption of risk. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343A, Comment e (1965). Assumption of risk is precluded
as a defense in maritime torts and in section 905(b) cases. E.g., The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936) ; SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. As the Supreme
Court has asserted:
Many considerations which apply to the liability of a vessel or its owner to a
seaman for the failure to provide safe appliances and a safe place to work are
absent or are of little weight in the circumstances which attend shore em-
ployment, in relation to which the common law rules of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence have been developed.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430 (1939). While applying § 343A
as the applicable negligence standard under section 905(b) may not constitute the
diametric opposite of precluding assumption of risk as a defense in maritime torts,
at the very least the situation represents a logical lacuna totally ignored by the courts.
107. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
108. Id. at 629. The district judge also erred in instructing the jury that con-
tributory negligence would operate as a complete bar to recovery. The jury should
have been instructed that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was to be considered
only in the mitigation of damages. However, the Court found this error had not
prejudiced the plaintiff since the jury had found in his favor. Id.
109. Id. at 630-31 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In Rowland, a common law negligence action,
the Supreme Court of California, by relying on Kermarec, abrogated the distinctions
between duties owed to licensees and invitees. The court reasoned:
There is another fundamental objection to the approach to the question of the
possessor's liability on the basis of the common law distinctions. . . . Whatever
may have been the historical justifications for the common law distinctions, it is
clear that those distinctions are not justified in the light of our modern society
and that the complexity and confusion . . . is not due to difficulty in applying
the original common law rules - they are all too easy to apply in their original
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Admittedly, there is a considerable difference between disallowing distinc-
tions to be made between licensees and invitees in admiralty and suggesting
that the common law standard of the landowner's duty to an invitee is
inappropriate as a measure in longshoremen's personal injury cases; how-
ever, the Court's language in Kermarec appears broad enough to cover
the point - especially since in Kermarec the district court correctly
eliminated the plaintiff's claim for unseaworthiness." 0 "Kermarec was not
a member of the ship's company, nor of that broadened class of workmen
to whom the admiralty law has latterly extended the absolute right to a
seaworthy ship.""' This analysis suggests that if the policy notions under-
lying Sieracki-Ryan and the Jones Act maritime negligence cases continue
to possess any residual value, then the appropriate negligence standards
for section 905(b) actions ought to be something quite different from
those found in the common law." 2 The next step is to determine if a
theoretical foundation for the cases can be found in the legislative history
of section 905 (b).
IV. INDICATIONS IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CONCERNING THE
SCOPE OF THE VESSEL'S DUTY OF CARE TO THE LONGSHOREMAN
A. A Legislative Standard?
Most of the congressional documents"' associated with the 1972
Amendments provide little aid in discerning the intent of Congress as to
the applicable standard by which to measure the shipowner's duty of care
formulation - but is due to the attempts to apply just rules in our modern
society within the ancient terminology.
* * * [T]he immunities from liability predicated upon those classifications,
and the exceptions to those immunities, often do not reflect the major factors
which should determine whether immunity should be conferred upon the possessor
of land. Some of those factors, including the closeness of the connection between
the injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the prevalence and avail-
ability of insurance, bear little, if any, relationship to the classifications ... and
the existing rules conferring immunity.
Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
110. 358 U.S. at 629.
111. Id.
112. E.g., notes 150-56 and accompanying text infra; cf. GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 3, § 6-53, at 436-38; id. 6-57, at 449-55.
113. See Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [herein-
after cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006, H.R.
15023 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; STAFF OF SUB-
COMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION ACT AMENDMENT - 1972 (Comm. Print 1972). The Senate Hearings and
the House Hearings cover essentially the same ground, but the Senate Hearings are
more comprehensive. The Legislative History is a compilation of all associated con-
gressional materials other than the hearings; unfortunately, it furnishes little help
in clarifying the applicable negligence standards under section 905(b).
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to the longshoreman. On one hand, testimony contained in the Senate and
House hearings is too partisan and too devoid of congressional inputs to
be of much use ;114 on the other hand, even the most useful documents, the
Senate and House reports, are written in such a broad manner that any
interpretation depends largely on the predilections of the interpreter. How-
ever, to arrive at their holdings, the courts have parsed the language of
these documents and pieced together an analytical mosaic which, it is
submitted, is more representative of a particular judicial point of view
than of congressional intent.
The principal language supporting the proposition that Congress in-
tended a land-based negligence standard to be the applicable basis for
decisions under 905(b) is found in the committee reports. The Senate
report stated:
[T]he Committee has concluded that, given the improvement in com-
pensation benefits which this bill would provide, it would be fairer to
all concerned and fully consistent with the objective of protecting the
health and safety of employees who work on board vessels for the
liability of the vessel as third parties to be predicated on negligence,
rather than the no-fault concept of seaworthiness. This would place
vessels in the same position, insofar as third party liability is concerned,
as land-based third parties in non-maritime pursuits.
The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured
aboard a vessel in the same position he would be if he were injured in
non-maritime employment ashore, and not to endow him with any
special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under whatever
judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as "unseaworthiness,"
"non-delegable duty," or the like.1 5
114. Compare Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 130-68, with id. at 258-93.
Neither the Senate Hearings nor the House Hearings contain a definitive statement
of the applicable standard. It was suggested to both committees that a specialized
conception of maritime negligence was applied in maritime suits that was consider-
ably different from common law negligence remedies. While such statements went
so far as to suggest that seaworthiness was the functional equivalent of maritime
negligence, there was little discussion of this beyond the response that maritime
negligence was but little different "from the theory of negligence which is now
applied by the courts on a construction site where you have hazardous activities
as well." Id. at 274.
Exhaustive quotation from the hearings to support the central idea of this
footnote would entail a footnote longer than the Comment and probably would
suffer the additional drawback of distortion because of a lack of contextual inputs.
Those interested in pursuing the question should begin with the following: id. Rt
53-34, 38, 65, 71, 130-31, 139-61, 174, 191-94, 208-11, 241, 263, 270-74, 296, 301-02;
House Hearings, supra note 113, at 50, 58, 78, 120, 137-38, 146, 237, 242.
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. Later, the Senate report added:
[Tihe Committee intends that the admiralty concept of comparative negligence
rather than the common law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in
cases where the injured employee's own negligence may have contributed to caus-
ing the injury. Also, the Committee intends that the admiralty rule which pre-
cludes the defense of "assumption of risk" in an action by an injured employee
shall also be applicable.
Id. at 12. Whether this language was also meant to indicate that common law
standards were those applicable, again, depends largely on the reader's point of view.
It can be argued that this is a gratuitous suggestion, since admiralty courts would
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The implications of this passage depend largely on one's point of view.
Commentators, who had examined the issue before any cases reached the
courts, arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions. Edward D. Vickery,
an attorney who represented shipowning interests and who testified be-
fore Congress concerning proposed amendments of the 1927 Act, argued
for a stringent model based on limited notions of the landowner's duties
to the business invitee." 0  However, leading admiralty scholars, Professors
Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr., have suggested that the Jones
Act, the seaman's statutory negligence remedy against the vessel, should
be read into the 1972 Amendments." 7 While these authors do not explicitly
state so, their position suggests, additionally, that the especially liberal
negligence standards and broad notions of the vessel's duty as outlined in
Jones Act cases" 8 form the appropriate frame of reference for defining
the vessel's duty to longshoremen for purposes of section 905(b). Other
approaches could also be taken. For instance, by focusing on the narrow
line of cases cited in the committee reports, it is possible to argue that
Congress specifically eliminated "seaworthiness"" 9 as a longshoreman's
remedy only where the vessel's liability was predicated on acts or omissions
of the stevedore or his employees. 120 In other words, a vessel's failure to
have determined in any event that comparative negligence applied and assumption of
risk as a defense was precluded. Cf. notes 104-06 supra.
116. See Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 INs. COUNSEL J. 63 (1974). Vickery
also testified before the Senate and House committees. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 113, at 293-351; House Hearings, supra note 113, at 104-32.
117. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-57, at 453.
118. See notes 27-46 and accompanying text supra.
119.
What does it mean to say that "the vessel" is liable for negligence but not
for unseaworthiness? The two terms overlap over most of the range of their
meanings. Only at the fringes can we identify such concepts as pure operating
negligence aboard a seaworthy vessel or unseaworthiness which is not caused by
someone's negligence. A formula which recurs in hundreds of cases is: the de-
fendant's negligence made the ship unseaworthy. In the seaman's action which
combines a Jones Act count with an unseaworthiness count, the two counts have
become . .. Siamese twins.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-57, at 452 (footnote omitted). Compare note 91
and accompanying text supra.
120. The Senate report provided:
Persons to whom compensation is payable under the Act retain the right
to recover damages for negligence against the vessel, but under these amend-
ments they cannot bring a damage action under the judicially-enacted doctrine of
unseaworthiness. Thus a vessel shall not be liable in damages for acts or omis-
sions of stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act, Crumedy v.
The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, Albanese v. Matts, 382 U.S. 283, Skibinski v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 330 F.2d 539; for the manner or method in which steve-
dores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act perform their work. A.N.G.
Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, Blassingill v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 336 F.2d 367; for gear or equipment of stevedores or employees of steve-
dores subject to this Act whether used aboard ship or ashore, Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Peterson, 347 U.S. 396, Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315,
or for other categories of unseaworthiness which have been judicially established.
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furnish equipment "reasonably fit for its intended use" constitutes "fault,"
in the parlance of maritime negligence actions, without regard to the open
and obvious nature of the defective condition. The result in Streatch may
be closely analogized to this position.
121
Considering the strengths of the rival factions - labor, shipowner,
and stevedore - and recognizing the courts' substantial expertise
in and intimacy with maritime matters, 122 it is submitted that most
probably Congress intended to simply leave the matter to the courts
as had been done in the past with other legislation where sensitive political
interests were involved.123 This position implicates a broad mandate to
the courts to develop the law of longshoremen's remedies in accordance
with their own understanding of how the 1972 Amendments altered the
considerations and perspectives which inspired the Sieracki-Ryan doctrine.
The decisions in the initial cases tend to support the notion that federal
judges have at least intuitively recognized a change in the relationship of
the longshoreman, stevedore, and harbor worker. 124 Since tort concepts
are ultimately the children of judicial ideas on social policy, 125 the con-
clusions of these cases may be quite correct. However, it would be better
if those decisions relied more on explicit policy considerations since by
and large the legislative history does not contain authoritative statements of
principle. 126 Seeking the most meaningful statement of congressional intent
in the context of the 1972 Amendments seems too largely a matter of
individual temperament, predilection, and judgment. Legal matrices, how-
ever formed from the diverse legislative history of the 1972 Amendments,
seem to have inherent contradictions and thus, ultimately portend in-
creased litigation. This effect is to undercut one of the clear purposes of
This listing of cases is not intended to reflect a judgment as to whether recovery
on a particular actual setting could be predicated on the vessel's negligence.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added); see the court's indecisive
analysis in Slaughter v. Steamship Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Ga. 1974), af'd,
509 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975); notes 122-25 and accompanying text infra.
121. See text accompanying notes 94-102 supra.
122. Traditionally the greater part of the maritime law has been fashioned by the
courts. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, ch. I passim.
123. Similar interpretative difficulties arose under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See, e.g.,
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
124. Only one case contains a concrete but careful expression of this notion. See
Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 384 F. Supp. 230, 235 n.3 (W.D.
Pa. 1974).
125. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 3.
126. Cf. Lucas v. "Brinknes" Shiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
In Lucas, the court relied explicitly on excerpts from the committee hearings. Id. at
767-68, 769-72. A number of other courts have cited Lucas in support of the
proposition that the Congress intended that the negligence standard under section
905(b) be derived from common law negligence theories. E.g., Ramirez v. Toko
Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1974). It is interesting to note,
however, that the Lucas court specifically left the question open, stating:
Congress perceived that it was eliminating the large number of cases in which
the vessel was held liable without fault pursuant to the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness. This perception was based on the assumption that the negligence
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the 1972 Amendments, reducing the caseload of the federal courts in
maritime personal injury suits.
127
B. The Cases In Light of the Legislative History - Some
Final Reflections
Under section 905(b), Streatch seems to be the least justifiable case.
That court appears to have ignored the plain language of section 905 (b),
which limits the liability of the vessel to injuries caused by its negligenceY.2
Nor is it helpful that the court suggested that the no-fault concept of
Section 402A is different from seaworthiness, because Section 402A ap-
plies only to "defects and render the product unreasonably dangerous ;,129
this is likely to be a post facto conclusion inherently susceptible to judicial
result selecting. Also, compensation paid by the stevedore largely eliminates
one of the fundamental premises of section 402A - lifting the burden of
the injury from the otherwise uncompensated plaintiff and placing it on the
person most able to socialize the costs.' 3 0  Finally, to separate into dif-
ferent legal components the shipowner's full legal status, which only grew
out of the stevedoring contract, was to hark back to judicial logic which
Congress clearly attempted to abrogate with the 1972 Amendments.' 3 '
Hite II, Ramirez, Citizen, and Fedison came closer to achieving a
useful expression of the congressional will, but these decisions also have
their faults. Absent is any discussion of the fact that longshoring is an
extremely dangerous occupation.'3 2 To suggest that safety is principally
the responsibility of the stevedore carries a hidden edge. If the increased
'benefits available as a result of the 1972 Amendments provide increased
incentives for the stevedore to implement better safety programs and thus
fulfill his responsibilities, then it seems to follow that after a period of
time, any accident rate greatly in excess of the average for land-based
occupations statistically represents hazards associated only with unsafe
shipboard conditions caused by the rigors of long voyages.138 Because these
remedy provided would be similar to the common law concept based on fault and
not any maritime negligence concept in which the vessel owed some special duty
to provide the longshoreman a safe place to work....
We cannot at this time fashion the outlines of the negligence remedy Con-
gress allowed to be brought against the vessel. This can only be left to future
case development.
379 F. Supp. at 767-68. See also note 76 supra.
127. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4-5.
128. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
129. 388 F. Supp. at 940.
130. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods,, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
131. The analysis in Streach seems analogous to that in Reed v. The Yaka, 373
U.S. 410 (1963), discussed in note 59 supra. Congress specifically aimed to vitiate
Reed with the 1972 Amendments. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
132. At the time the 1972 Amendments were enacted, the injury frequency rate
for the longshoring industry was over four times the national average for manu-
facturing operations. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
133. Cf. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-57, at 455.
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hazards must be different in kind and in degree134 from those unavoidable,
commonplace dangers which the land-based worker is exposed to in the
course of a day's work and which have shaped the landowner's common
law duties, common law negligence conceptions are likely to be largely
unworkable in a maritime setting. This in turn suggests that a long-term
reduction of the courts' workload of shore-related maritime personal injury
cases is largely illusory as long as the courts continue the trend of rigidly
forcing common law negligence into maritime molds.135
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND A MODEST RECOMMENDATION
Subtle historical and social notions undercut the results of the initial
cases. Unburdened by the social currents which shaped the common law,
maritime law historically developed with emphasis on certainty coupled
with practicality. 136 Should the facts of Hite 1I, Fedison, Citizen, Ramirez
and other cases be even slightly changed, 137 analogizing the shipowner's
position in maritime law to that of the landowner's in tort raises serious
questions. 13  The maritime worker has long enjoyed a special status in
the courts. 139 For the longshoreman, Sieracki represented the greatest
manifestation of this concept. While Usner and Victory cast doubt upon
the viability of the harbor worker's presence within the chosen circle,140
the committee reports suggest that Congress was aware of these protective
notions. Thus, it is submitted that while Congress overruled Sieracki's
specific holding, it nonetheless bowed, at least in part, to the judicial logic
which formed the basis for that decision and which continued to find
expression in the cases until Victory.141 The following three considera-
tions principally underlay Congress' purpose in enacting the 1972 Amend-
ments: first, a recognition that the benefits and coverage provided by the
134. This constituted one of labor's major arguments in its opposition to the
elimination of seaworthiness for the longshoreman. E.g., Senate Hearings, supra note
113, at 130-31.
135. Cf. note 106 supra.
136. Cf. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3376) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)
(Story, J.).
137. See, note 103 supra.
138. See notes 104-09 and accompanying text supra. Cf. LARSON, supra note 13,
§ 91.77.
139. E.g., Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823)
(Story, J.) (perhaps the best known and one of the earliest of the courts' expressions
of the maritime workers' special status).
140. See text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
141. The Senate report seemed to recognize that even under section 905(b),
Sieracki retained some residual value:
The Committee believes that especially with the vast improvement in compen-
sation benefits which the bill would provide, there is no compelling reason to
continue to require vessels to assume what amounts to absolute liability for
injuries which occur to longshoremen or other workers covered under the Act
who are injured while working on those vessels. In reaching this conclusion,
the Committee has noted that the seaworthiness concept was developed by the
courts to protect seamen from the extreme hazards incident to their employ-
ment which frequently requires long sea voyages and duties of obedience to
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1927 Act had to be enlarged and extended ;142 second, a realization that
although the Sieracki-Ryan doctrine generated crowded courts and in-
creased expenses - particularly lawyers' fees and insurance costs - it
provided few additional monetary benefits for the injured employee or his
family ;143 and third, a concern that "every appropriate means be applied
toward improving" the working conditions and the safety of the long-
shoring industry.144 Each of these considerations should be a vector in
arriving at the most accurate judicial expression of the congressional will.
However, the courts have tended to focus on one consideration or an-
other - more often as a justification for the rule of law announced in the
decision than as part of a logical legal equation. 1 45 The basic problem is
that facile analogies readily extend the "open and obvious defect" doc-
trine of the early cases to nearly all circumstances where the hazard
causing the injury resulted from the vessel's act or omission. This seems
inherently suspect when it is realized that most cargo is carried in vessels
of foreign registry that as a matter of course are inherently less sus-
ceptible to American safety regulations and, therefore, are likely to have
conditions aboard less safe than the conditions that the longshoreman
has a right to expect under the law. The initial cases seem to go a long
way towards diluting the protection afforded by this right. The doctrine
of those cases excuses the vessel while placing the major loss on those
least able to bear it - the longshoreman and his family. Additionally, a
hidden notion of Ramirez seems to impose, however indirectly, the ex-
pertise of the stevedore on the longshoreman; this result is questionable
as a matter of legal theory and reality. 146
In short, it is apparent that Sieracki continues to hold a meaning
whose content has yet to be evaluated by the courts.1 47 Additionally, as
the courts sort through the exceptions and contradictions of common law
orders not generally required of other workers. The rationale which justifies
holding the vessel absolutely liable to seamen if the vessel is unseaworthy does
not apply with equal force to longshoremen and other non-seamen working on
board on [sic] vessel while it is in port.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10 (emphasis added); cf. LARSON, supra note 17,
at 14-81 to -82; notes 119-21 and accompanying text supra.
142. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4-5.
143. Id. See also Turner v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D.
412 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
144. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
145. Compare, e.g., Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 645 (C.D.
Cal. 1974), with Streatch v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 935,
938 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (courts' statements as to the main purpose of the 1972
Amendments).
146. Ramirez proposed that the duty of care owed by the vessel to the stevedore
and the longshoremen were substantially identical. See 385 F. Supp. at 651-52; note
88 and accompanying text supra. Whether this ought to be the case or not is open
to argument as the first duty arises as a matter of contract between equal parties
bargaining at arm's length while the second is a matter of tort conceptions formed
to protect a class that appears largely helpless to control the situation, especially in
light of current economic conditions. See note 156 infra.
147. For a similar proposition advanced from a slightly different point of view,
see GILMORE & BLACK, suPra note 3, § 6-46, at 411-12.
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negligence concepts, the resulting litigation is likely to be more vexious
than useful and probably quite as self-contradictory as anything under the
Sieracki-Ryan principle. Common law concepts are ill-suited to the needs,
conditions, and hazards associated with maritime employment and seem
to be too drastic a break with the scope of protections traditionally ex-
tended to maritime employees.
On the other hand, full and uncritical extension of negligence con-
cepts as developed in the Jones Act cases is unjustified especially in that
the full scope of protections offered by these cases simply approaches
"seaworthiness" by utilizing another name. Yet, the thrust of the Jones
Act cases is that, as a maritime duty, the vessel owner, at the least, owes
to workers aboard the vessel a duty to furnish a vessel free from recog-
nizable hazards likely to cause harm.148 This notion is echoed in the
"general duty" section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSHA). 149 This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and
a place of employment which are free from recognized haz-
ards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees .... 150
In the committee reports on the 1972 Amendments, Congress em-
phasized that "nothing in [the Amendments] is intended to relieve any
vessels ... from their obligations and duties under the Occupational Safety
148. See text accompanying notes 28-47 supra.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970).
150. Id. § 654(a). A question arises whether the term employer has the same
meaning in both acts. The 1972 Amendments redefined the term:
The term "employer" means an employer any of whose employees are em-
ployed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an em-
ployer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).
33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1970). A vessel
is excluded from this definition. See note 77 supra. Under the OSHA:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in a business affecting com-
merce who has employees, but does not include the United States or any State
or political subdivision of a State.
29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970). The safety standard provided for the "employer" in the
1927 Act is significantly narrower than is the OSHA general duty standard. Section
941 of the 1927 Act provides:
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and places of em-
ployment which shall be reasonably safe for his employees in all employments
covered by this chapter and shall install, furnish, maintain, and use such devices
and safeguards with particular reference to equipment used by and working
conditions established by such employers as the Secretary may determine ...
to be reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of such em-
ployees, and to render safe such employment and places of employment and to
prevent injury to his employees.
33 U.S.C. § 941(a) (1970) (emphasis added). Compare text accompanying note
149 supra.
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss2/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and Health Act of 1970."' 151 Thus, a feasible argument is that section
905(b) ought to be read in light of the parallel general duty standard
outlined in the OSHA.152 The OSHA does not provide for a private
right of action as an enforcement sanction. 15 ' However, if OSHA's
"general duty" section does apply to the vessel owner as the statutory
authorities seem to indicate'54 and if an argument can be made that
OSHA's "penalty" section' 55 is unlikely to best effectuate the purposes
of the act because of the foreign registry of most carriers, then strong
reasons exist for the courts as a matter of "maritime common law" juris-
diction to create a private right of action against the vessel owner using
the OSHA "general duty" section as the appropriate standard. While this
standard transcends the policy notions expressed or implied in the early
cases following Hite II, it has the likely virtue of being more expressive
of congressional policy considerations which underlay both acts than does
the mere implanting of common law concepts into section 905 (b). Refine-
ment and development of this suggested standard will be required, 156 but
it would seem that this could be done in ways that are at once more open,
more expressive of maritime conditions, and less contradictory than those
implicated by the courts' current trend.
J. Charles Sheak
151. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. This section in the report relates
specifically to section 905(b).
152. Cf. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959),
wherein the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board for pur-
poses not inimical to his legitimate interest the duty of exercising reasonable care
under the circumstances of each case.
Id. at 632 (footnote omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-88C
(1965); Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of
Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 612, 616-17, 635-38 (1974).
153. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 653(b) (4), 657, 659 (1970).
154. See note 150 supra.
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. IV, 1974). OSHA provides for enforcement
through use of civil fines or criminal imprisonment. Fines accrue to the United
States. Jd.
156. For discussions concerning refinements of OSHA's general duty standard,
see Miller, supra note 152; Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1973). Admittedly the OSHA
standard may create another kind of absolute liability; however, this can be avoided
by interpreting the section to afford the vessel owner the benefit of various defenses.
For instance, the vessel could avoid liability by showing that: 1) it was not eco-
nomically feasible to remedy the defect, see id. at 993; cf. United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.), or 2) the owner's duty
was discharged by the employment of a skillful and competent stevedore who could be
expected to recognize and properly safeguard against the hazard in the course of his
operations and that the costs to the stevedore of the delay or repairs were provided
for in the vessel's contract with the stevedore, or were commonly accepted as an
added cost in similar operations. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965).
See also Senate Hearings, supra note 113, at 151, 673. Apparently, a major complaint
of labor representatives was that stevedores often cut safety standards in order to
remain competitive in terms of turn-around time and costs.
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